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COMMENTS
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DISCLOSING OTHER CRIMES
By W. CLINTON SHIFFLET
The purpose of a criminal prosecution is to determine the guilt or
innocence of the person charged with the crime set out in the information
or indictment. To obtain a conviction, the state bears the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury that the accused committed the crime.
This proof consists of direct evidence from eyewitnesses of the commission
of the act itself or from circumstantial evidence tending to raise an inference
of guilt. This evidence is collected and presented to the jury, from which
they determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To satisfy this burden of proof prosecutors have attempted to show
as evidence bearing on the crime charged, the guilt of the accused of crimes
not mentioned in the indictment or information. Generally the courts refuse
to allow the introduction of this evidence, saying either that evidence tending
to prove the defendant guilty of crimes other than the one charged is
inadmissible' or it is not competent to prove guilt of a crime charged by
proving the commission of other crimes.'
Several reasons have been assigned by the courts for their application
of this rule, but the one most often given is that the probative value of other
crime evidence is slight as compared to its prejudicial effect on the jury.'
This fear of prejudice is not unfounded and is the basis of other rules govern-
ing criminal prosecutions.4 An illustration of this is the presumption of
innocence which has its origin in the tendency of mankind to think that
where there's smoke there's bound to be some fire.5 If the prosecution were
allowed indiscriminately to introduce into evidence the guilt of the accused
of other crimes, convictions would probably be based on criminal propensity
rather than actual guilt.6
This rule of total exclusion prevailed for a long time, and evidence of
other crimes was not admitted.7 The rule was enunciated as inflexible and
'20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 309, p. 287; 20 A.L.R.2d 1013.
'Hall v. United States, 150 U.S. 76, 14 S.Ct. 22, 37 L.Ed. 1003 (1893) ; People v. King, 122 Cal.
App. 50, 10 P.2d 89 (1932) ; People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 327, 14 N.E. 319 (1887) ; 22 C.J.S., Criminal
Law, § 682, p. 1084.
'People v. Pollock, 31 Cal.App.2d 747, 89 P.2d 128 (1939) ; Missouri v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200,
136 S.W. 316 (1910) ; 116 A.L.R. 554.
'First National Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691 (1923).
"Car v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 4 So.2d 887 (1941).
'State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1 (1939) (Pointing out the danger of admitting
evidence of other crimes, the court said in effect that such evidence results in predisposing the minds
of the jury to believing the defendant guilty, and thus to effectually strip him of all presumption
of innocence.).
7MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935); Smith v. State, 195 Wis. 555,
218 N.W. 822 (1928).
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universal in application. However, gradually exceptions were made in
certain cases in the interest of justice or necessity.' Thus, in 1874 a New
York court allowed evidence of other crimes to prove the element of guilty
knowledge where the defendant was charged with receiving stolen property.
The court justified this exception on the ground that it was a necessary element
of the prosecution's case, and while a court must do all in its power to prevent
a jury from becoming prejudiced against the defendant, it must not favor
him to the point of putting the prosecution at a disadvantage.
9
It is difficult to quarrel with the reasoning that if justice is to be served
the courts must not hamper the prosecution unduly. The prosecution is
charged with the duty of public protection and must be allowed latitude in
the performance of its duties. On the other hand, the courts are charged
with the duty of limiting the admission of evidence so that convictions are
based on facts rather than mere conjecture, grounded on the criminal pro-
pensity of the defendant.
Exceptions
The general rule of exclusion of evidence tending to prove the defendant
guilty of crimes other than the one specified in the indictment has been
modified by certain well defined exceptions.' These exceptions fall into four
main categories and, as one court put it, have so riddled the general rule of
exclusion that the rule has become the exception and the exceptions the rule."
Thus evidence of other crimes may be introduced :(1) when it tends to prove
an element necessary to the prosecution's case; (2) when it tends to prove
motive or intent; (3) when it tends to identify the defendant; (4) when it
tends to show a common plan or scheme of which this crime is one element. 2
Motive and Intent
It is now well settled that to prove intent relevant evidence may be intro-
duced even though it discloses other crimes committted by the defendant.' 3
In most cases where evidence is admitted to prove felonious intent the defend-
ant admits the act but claims that it was an accident or a mistake. 4 Here
'People v. Popescue, 345 IlI. 142, 177 N.E. 739 (1931); Fehlman v. State, 199 Ind. 746,
161 N.E. 8 (1928) (Burglary, absolute necessity for the admission of such evidence creates the
exception) ; State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
'Copperman v. People, 56 N.Y. 591, 1 Hun. 15 (1874).
"°People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 46 Pac. 153 (1896).
"United States v. Sebo, 101 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1939).
"People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 195 (1901).
"Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1949); People v. Craig, 111 Cal. 460,
44 Pao. 186 (1896).
"People v. Tibbitts, 35 Cal.App.2d 669, 96 P.2d 812 (1939) ; People v. Hall, 172 Misc. 930,
16 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1939).
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evidence that the defendant made one or more unsuccessful prior attempts
to commit the act charged is admitted to show intent and negate the claim
of accident or mistake.' 5 The courts admit this evidence on the ground that
its probative value outweighs the danger of its prejudicial effect.' 6 In similar
cases where the defendant denies the act, courts also admit evidence showing
other crimes to show motive or intent. However, in these cases the courts
carefully instruct the jury to consider the evidence only in connection with
intent and to ignore it in determining whether or not the defendant actually
did the act.' 7
The element of motive is closely akin to that of intent. Since motive
will often bear on intent the courts have generally held that evidence relevant
to motive is admissible even though it tends to prove the defendant guilty
of other crimes.'"
Identity
Another exception to the general rule of exclusion is that evidence of
other crimes is admissible to identify the defendant as the person who com-
mitted the crime."9 Thus if a witness is unable to identify a defendant on
trial for robbery the prosecution can introduce evidence that the defendant
robbed another person at or about the same place and time. This will tend
to rebut a claim that some other person committed the crime. Although this
evidence tends to prove the defendant guilty of another crime it also tends
to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime charged, since the defendant
was shown to have committed similar crimes in the vicinity. In order to
introduce evidence of other crimes to prove identity there must be some
logical connection between the other crimes and the crime charged."0 In the
illustration above, the connection was similar time and place. In other cases
a unique habit or modus operandi have been held to be sufficient connection.2 '
However, mere similarity in method of operation or means would not be
sufficient, because there is usually some similarity in all crimes of the same
type.
When evidence of other crimes is admitted to prove intent the courts
instruct the jury that it can be considered only for the limited purpose of
"
8 State v. LaPage, 57 N.H. 245, 294 (1876) ; People v. Popescue, note 8 supra.
"Commonwealth v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 169 At. 564 (1933).
"People v. Folignos, 322 I11. 304, 153 N.E. 373 (1926) (Evidence which shows the commission
of other offenses should be received with care, and the trial court should make clear to the jury
that the evidence is being received for the sole purpose of showing the intent with which the act
charged was done.).
"
8 State v. Gaule, 234 Minn. 186, 48 N.W.2d 44 (1951).
"'People v. McMonigle, 29 Cal.2d 730, 177 P.2d 745 (1947).
"
0 Miller v. State, 13 Okl.Cr. 176, 163 Pac. 131 (1917) (The court held that mere similarity in
method of operation or means would not serve to identify.).2 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 491, 239 S.W. 776 (1922) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 107.
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showing intent. However, when identity is at issue evidence of other crimes
may be considered to prove identity and to determine whether or not the
defendant actually committed the crime. For this reason the courts admit this
evidence for purposes of identity with more care and generally impose
higher standards in ruling on the connection required than when it is admitted
for other purposes. 2
Common Plan or Scheme
Evidence of other crimes is also admissible to prove a crime charged
if it tends to show a common plan or scheme embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to estab-
lish the other.23 The basis of this exception to the exclusion rule is that a
plan or scheme, of which the crime committed is a part, is such a circum-
stance surrounding the crime that a jury would be warranted in finding from
it, together with other evidence, that the accused committed the crime.
24
Again due to the prejudicial effect of other crime evidence the courts are
strict in requiring a logical connection between the other crimes and the one
charged in order to show a pre-existing plan.25
A majority of the courts follow the rule of excluding evidence of other
crimes unless the case falls within one of the recognized exceptions. A small
minority holds that evidence showing other crimes may always be admitted
where it is relevant, except to show criminal propensity.20 It is suggested
that it is more logical to admit other crime evidence where it has probative
value which outweighs the possible prejudicial effects. However, this view
has not been generally accepted and the great majority of cases have entirely
excluded evidence of other crimes unless the case comes within the so-called
exceptions.27
Confusion
Although the exceptions to this general rule of exclusion are fairly
well defined in most jurisdictions,2" their application has resulted in conflict
22 WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE § 304, pp. 202, 204.
2 Giordano v. United States and Stern v. United States, 185 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1950) ; People
v. Burns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952) ; 20 A.L.R. 1001; 4 NICHOLLS, APPLIED EVIDENCE
3425.2 See note 22 supra.
2 State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225 (1930) (There must be some connection
between the crimes to show that there existed in fact in the mind of the defendant a common
purpose that included the commission of the crime charged.) ; 73 A.L.R. 380.2 State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, RULE 311 (1942).
2751 HARv. L. REV. 988 (1937) (A good discussion on the soundness of judicial reasoning with
particular reference to the alleged exceptions to the general rule excluding other crimes from evi-
dence. The writer states that the exceptions are the result of not fully understanding the rule of
relevancy.)2 Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928) ; 63 A.L.R. 595.
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between jurisdictions and courts in the same jurisdiction. This is illustrated
in two recent California cases, People v. Coefield29 and People v. Grimes,3"
one in the District Court of Appeals and the other in the Supreme Court.
Both of these cases deal with the California version of the common plan
or scheme exception, and in both evidence of other crimes was admitted
because of a novel application of this exception.
In the Supreme Court case, People v. Coefield, the defendant was on
trial for murder, a homicide performed in the commission of a robbery.
Evidence was introduced to show that the defendant and two others entered
a liquor store armed and intending to commit robbery. The defendant
ordered the clerk to "hand over all the money," and forced him into a back
room, where he hit him on the head with the barrel of his gun. This blow
did not render the clerk unconscious and when he started to get up the
defendant hit him again, at which point the gun went off. The bullet pierced
the clerk's head, killing him.
Purporting to show a common plan to rob liquor stores, the prosecution
offered to show three other robberies committed by the defendant within
a month of the robbery that resulted in the death of the clerk. In each of the
other robberies, the defendant had followed the same procedure. He had
forced the clerk into a back room where he hit him on the head with a gun.
The prosecution contended that this similarity tended to prove a plan to
rob liquor stores and to make an escape by hitting the clerk on the head.
The trial court admitted the evidence, and on appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed. The Supreme Court commented on the general rule, noted the
exceptions and said that in view of the similarity in method of operation
the evidence was admissible to prove a common plan and therefore intent
despite the fact that it disclosed other crimes.
* Here the defendant was indicted under section 189 of the California
Penal Code, which provides that a homicide committed in the course of a
robbery is murder in the first degree. Since intent was supplied by statute
the prosecution was required to show only that the defendant committed
robbery and that he committed the homicide. Instead, to show intent the
court allowed prejudicial evidence to be admitted to supply a questionable
common plan.
In People v. Grimes, decided in the District Court of Appeals, the
defendant was charged with burglarizing a drugstore. There was a great
deal of evidence, some of which placed the defendant in the area of the
crime about the time of the burglary and some of which tended to show that
the defendant had committed the crime. The prosecution introduced into
evidence the fact that the defendant had previously committed several burg-
"People v. Coefield, 37 Cal.2d 865, 236 P.2d 570 (1951).
"People v. Grimes, 113 CaLApp.2d 401, 248 P.2d 130 (1950).
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laries. It was shown that he had on these other occasions gained entrance
to drugstores by kicking out a window, reaching through the glass and
slipping the bolt on the door. The crime with which he was charged had been
committed in the same way, the glass had been smashed out and the bolt
had been turned by reaching through the hole. The trial court admitted
the evidence of the other burglaries under a limited instruction that it could
be considered only for the purpose of showing identity, intent or common
plan or scheme. The appellate court affirmed the resulting conviction, saying
that the method of operation was so similar that it tended to show a system,
plan or design that the defendant had used before.
This decision seems to mark a point of departure from the previously
accepted common plan exception. Heretofore evidence of other crimes was
admitted to show a common plan or scheme only if the evidence tended to
show a common plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that the proof of one tended to establish the other. 1
This is not the case here. It is probable that the method of entrance used in
this case was the best one and would have been used by anyone robbing
a drugstore.
It seems obvious that the admission of the evidence on a showing of
similarity in mode of operation was based on a departure from the accepted
common-plan reasoning. Wigmore"2 points out that in proving a common
plan or scheme, there must be such a concurrence of common features that
the various acts can be explained completely with reference to a common
plan. He further points out that common features, when used in connection
with common plan, are aspects that can only be explained by the existence
of an overall plan. Each crime must point to the completion of a plan. 3
To illustrate, if a defendant charged with rape denies the charge, the prose-
cution will be allowed to prove that the defendant kidnapped the victim
shortly before the alleged rape. This evidence would be allowed even though
it disclosed another crime because the kidnapping would be explained by
the overall plan to rape.3
The common features required to show identity are to be distinguished
from the common features required to show a common plan or scheme.
Whereas in the latter mere similarity of operation is not sufficient, it is suffi-
cient to introduce evidence of other crimes to show identity.
81See note 23 supra.
"'See note 22 supra.
"Vigil v. State, 33 Ariz. 51, 262 Pac. 14 (1927) ; People v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85, 50 Pac. 390
(1897) (Robbery, evidence of a conspiracy to kidnap admitted to show a common plan.) ; People v.
Kruvosky, 53 Cal.App. 744, 200 Pac. 831 (1921).
"(People v. Ciulla, 44 Cal.App. 719, 187 Pac. 46 (1919).
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Other Jurisdictions
This common plan or scheme exception is recognized in other juris-
dictions and has been dealt with in varying ways. In Pennsylvania, evidence
of other crimes will be admitted under the common plan exception if, as
in California, the other crimes are traceable to a common plan. However,
here if the similarity in the mode of operation is striking, the common plan
exception will be extended to cover.33 On the other hand, in a recent New
York case the court refused to allow evidence of other crimes to be admitted
even where there was similarity in the mode of operation. The court said
that the defendant should not be connected with the crime charged merely
because he had committed other crimes in that way, where that method was
common to anyone who had the disposition to use it. 6 While rejecting the
common plan theory altogether, Tennessee has recently held that other crimes
may be shown to identify the defendant as the one who committed the crime
charged. 7
Conclusion
In both the Coefield and the Grimes cases the California courts allowed
evidence of other crimes to be admitted to prove a common plan or scheme
where the only common factor was similarity in the mode of operation.
Since similarity alone is not sufficient to apply the common plan exclusion
either historically or logically, the California courts have apparently enunci-
ated a new rule. This fifth exception to the rule that evidence of other crimes
is inadmissible to prove a crime applies the coukmon feature requirement
of the common scheme or plan exception to cases wherein the only similarity
is a mode of operation available to anyone.
Since every action performed to accomplish an end has a certain simi-
larity to every other action performed to accomplish a similar end, the
hazards of this rule are obvious. Every robbery has features similar to
every other robbery, every burglary features similar to every other burglary
and every rape features in common with every other rape. How far the
courts will go in allowing this exception only a well reasoned case can tell us.
However, as it is, the situation is fraught with prejudicial possibilities.
"*Swan v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 218, 14 W.N.C. 67 (1883).
sPeople v. Hassan, 196 App.Div. 89, 187 N.Y.Supp. 115 (1921).
""Warren v. State, 178 Tenn. 157, 156 S.W.2d 416 (1951).

